THE PARSONS REVIVAL
as the starting point of systematic sociological explanation without justifying this choice.
To begin with the obvious: there is no one among his contemporaries who developed a social theory of comparable complexity. The autobiographical intellectual history that Parsons published in 1974 gives an initial insight into the consistency and the cumulative success of the effort which this scholar of more than fifty years has put into the construction of a single theory. As it stands today, the work is unparalleled in regard to its level of abstraction, internal differentiation, theoretical breadth and systematicity -all of which is, simultaneously, connected to the literature of each particular empirical field. Although the interest in this theory has slackened since the mid 1960s, and though Parsons's later work has at times been pushed into the background by hermeneutically and critically oriented investigations, no social theory can be taken seriously today which does not-at the very least-clarify its relationship to Parsons's. Whoever deludes himself about this fact allows himself to be captured by contemporary issues rather than rationally confronting them. That goes also for a neoMarxism which wishes simply to bypass Parsons-in the history of social science, errors of this type are normally quickly corrected. This spirited justification of Parsons's continuing importance-indeed, his classical stature-may seem too wearily familiar. Slightly defensive and a little too strident, it is written, one might suppose, by one of the aggrieved orthodoxy, another former student of Parsons flaying hopelessly against the tide of intellectual history.
But such a supposition would be wrong. This passage was written by Jurgen Habermas, Germany's leading social theorist and, many would argue, the leading critical social theorist in the world today. With the rebirth of political activity in the 1960s, and the growing distance that separated German intellectual life from the ravages of the inter-war period, German sociological theory revived. At first this revival was almost entirely within the framework of critical theory. The best-known German theoretical discussions undoubtedly were the celebrated arguments over positivism, in which critical theorists like Adorno and Horkheimer debated critical rationalists like Popper and Albert. The student movement of the late 1960s gave added force to this theoreticalcum-political revival, pushing it, in the process, toward a more orthodox and deterministic brand of Marxism, a framework within which the bulk of substantive German sociology remains. Yet German theoretical development continued to grow and change. The most distinguished younger member of the Frankfurt school, Habermas also took part in the early positivism dispute, which helped revitalize the younger generation of German theorists. As compared with the situation in the United States-Mertonian injunctions notwithstanding-the cultural studies tradition in Europe has been much more sharply differentiated into separate theoretical and practical strands. Sociological theory in Europe has tended toward the philosophical and speculative rather than the explanatory. This has been nowhere more true than in Germany, the country Marx scorned as a nation of philosophers. Marx's criticism, of course, was motivated not only by his country's philosophical penchant, for the German inclination for social philosophy is usually combined with an inclination toward idealism. German theorists want their philosophy to be explicitly normative; it should make the world more meaningful, providing answers to the basic problems of existence. Traditionally, German theory has accomplished this task in one of two ways: (1) it has argued that the world is not a fragmented and individualized world of material constraints but a unified, organic community of spiritual ties; (2) it has argued that although the world is in fact materialistic and fragmented, it need not be, and that a more spiritualized existence is possible.
This penchant for philosophy and ambivalent idealism is German theory's strength and its weakness. It provides the German tradition with a richness and depth that often make the Anglo-American tradition seem shallow by comparison. At the same time, it makes German theory often frustratingly far removed from mundane explanatory concerns, and it also leads, in many cases, to an either/or approach to epistemological and ideological dilemmas. Theory should focus either on norms or on interest; modern societies should be either utilitarian and modern or romantic, in either the conservative or the radical sense. Rather than an agnostic position that, rather sloppily, says "a little of each," German social theory often insists that a choice be made.
Although German social theory today continues to reflect the strengths and weaknesses of this double heritage, it has moved closer to sociological theory in the American and English sense. Marxism, of course, has been one important bridging mechanism, for it can encourage explanatory empirical efforts while providing both metaphysical anchoring and the indictment of a normless and Habermas's "critical Parsonianism" seems to me one-sided and wrong. He has drastically depersonalized the social system and overly moralized the lifeworlds of culture and experience. His theory finds answers to the problems of existence, and it does so in a philosophically brilliant and satisfying way. Yet in doing so, Habermas has reintroduced the epistemological and ideological dichotomies of idealism. But it is really not enough to locate Habermas by placing him within this broad tradition. To understand the evolution of his relation to Parsons, we must appreciate the specific dialogue through which his later attitude toward Parsonian theory developed. We must turn, for this, to Niklas Luhmann.
In the early 1970s, Habermas and Luhmann engaged in a major debate over the relative advantages of "critical" versus "systems" theory. Is the essence of modernity the freedom and order allowed by the differentiation of systems or the gap between a universalized culture and a rationalized society? Whereas Habermas argued that systems theory technologized society and actually eliminated choice, Luhmann argued that all societies are in fact subject to certain "technical" constraints and that by conceptualizing these demands, systems theory can transcend ideology and provide an objective framework for social analysis. Systems in Luhmann's work have a mechanistic and naturalistic cast. Parsons avoided this danger because he insisted that social systems were always interpenetrated by meaning and culture. Luhmann does not; he rarely talks about meaning as such, preferring to discuss culture as an epiphenomenon of the need to reduce system complexity through trust. Luhmann poses the dichotomy of theories of meaningful action versus systems analysis; Parsons's theory starts with meaningful action and derives the concepts of culture and social system from the need to coordinate it. For Luhmann, systems are reified, they have purposes. When Parsons's systems are reified, he misspeaks himself; he is usually conscious that "system" is an intellectual abstraction. In Luhmann's work there can be no question of ethics or morality being opposed to system demands, since there is no internalized source of moral conflict outside of system demands. For Parsons, by contrast, culture is always a system analytically separated from society, and as differentiation and complexity increase, this distinction is accentuated. For Luhmann, distrust is a residual category; for Parsons, it is not only an ever-present possibility but something that modern society systematically encourages even while it seeks its control. For Luhmann, people are primordially experiential; Parsons's people certainly are affectual as well, but they are also thinking, moral beings who have the potential for rationality and complex judgments. Here is the difference, perhaps, between Husserlian psychology and neo-Kantian liberalism.
Luhmann too, therefore, has used Parsonianism to reintroduce the dichotomies that Parsons sought to avoid. His dichotomies seem at first to be directly opposite from those Habermas posits, yet in actuality they complement them. Luhmann tells us that truth, love, and trust are part of everyday bourgeois life, and in this he could not be more different from Habermas's critical Parsonianism. Still, he locates the "base" of this society in intrinsically nonmeaningful syscem demands. The structures of society and the processes that change them exist "behind the backs" of actors, independent of their will. And society can become only more differentiated and atomized, so despite the presence of media, meaningful integration and community are increasingly difficult. There is in Luhmann's theory a strain of Realpolitik, a strain reinforced by his relative conservatism about activism and change. He has escaped from idealism, but Realpolitik, with its weary and often cynical acceptance of workaday demands, has always been the other side of idealism in the German tradition.
We have now found one of the hidden reasons for Habermas's idiosyncratic use and misuse of Parsons's work. If Luhmann is, after all, "the German Parsons," then systems theory may indeed be viewed as embodying a form of instrumental rationality, and the lifeworld and symbolic discourse may appear as legitimate In the spring of 1981, Schluchter gave a talk at UCLA entitled "Current Trends in German Sociological Theory." These trends, he suggested, were the critical communications theory of Habermas, the systems theory of Luhmann, the action theory of Munch, and the Weberian theory of developmental history. This last theoretical strand is his own, and Schluchter has skillfully dedicated himself to demonstrating its superiority over the other three. Schluchter argues that these three movements are independent and antagonistic to one another; I have argued here to the contrary, that they can also be seen as three variations on Parsonian thought. So, I would also argue, can a major thrust of Schluch- If German sociological theory is blossoming today, it is at least in part because of its vivid encounter with Talcott Parsons. Parsons is read and studied in Germany today not because of his "Germanness"-the abstraction and generality that so bothers Americans-but because he has succeeded in bringing to German theory synthetic and explanatory perspectives that its native traditions often lack. It is this specifically theoretical dimension of Parsons that the Germans seek out. They regard Americans' political readings and denunciations of Parsons as naive and intellectually immature. They are right. The younger German scholars interested in Parsons today are leftists and liberals.
In America, of course, the relationship of sociological theory to Parsons has been burdened with much more historical and psychological freight. It was here that Parsons once exercised his much-disputed domination. If sociology were to be free to develop, this domination had to be overthrown. The attacks on Parsons, which spanned the three postwar decades of his life, were often significant. Anti-Parsonian attacks spawned every major movement of theoretical reform, each of which initially presented itself vis-avis some particular dimension of Parsons's work. Now that Parsons is gone, however, and the status of his corpus in American theory severely diminished, these new theories stand as radically incomplete. Each concentrates on one strand of Parsons's original work, and when considered together they revive all the significant dichotomies that Parsons's framework was designed to resolve. If these theoretical pieces are ever going to be put back together again, it will take more than the king's men. Only another equally synthetic theory could do the job. This theory, I believe, would have to be a neofunctionalism modeled generally after Parsons's own: It would have to refer to system while recognizing will; it would have to maintain components of norms and of interests; it would have to explain conflict and cooperation. To simply bypass Parsons, as Habermas has reminded us in the passage that begins this essay, would be a serious intellectual mistake. Trying to discuss the relation between action and structure or between micro-and macrosociology without reference to Parsons is like trying to reinvent the wheel. If Parsons is to be transcended, it can be only by a true Aufheben, through what Hegel called a concrete rather than abstract negation. It is tempting to say that the current American "stupidity" about Parsons's work will be overcome by the continuing translation of these new German texts and that this will be one result of the new Europeanization of American social theory, along with the ideologicalization of our debates and our introduction to tout Paris. Certainly this is partly true. Durkheim came back to France via American sociology and English anthropology. Weber was brought back to Germany through Parsons and Bendix. Yet it is also clear, I think, that the renewal of serious interest in Parsons has already begun here at home. There is some talk and some handwringing about an incipient "Parsons revival." One reason is the growing interest in theory itself. The bloom is off the rose of quantitative sociology, and more historical and comparative work is back in fashion. Another reason is decreasing excitement over Marxist and critical work, for even while the competent practice of Marxist sociology has spread enormously, the social and cultural reasons for its ideological renewal have begun-in every western nation-to wither on the vine. And finally, if there is the beginning of a Parsons revival here at home, it is due in no small part to the intrinsic quality of Parsons's intellectual work, a quality that German sociological theory has recently come to appreciate.
